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AEDPA’S RATCHET: INVOKING THE MIRANDA RIGHT
TO COUNSEL AFTER THE ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
David Rubenstein
Abstract: In Davis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established a high
standard to invoke the Miranda right to counsel, holding that a suspect must make a clear and
unequivocal request for an attorney. Two years later, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which created a highly deferential standard of review
for state court judgments challenged under federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Generally, a
state prisoner challenging the alleged deprivation of his Miranda right to counsel may obtain
federal court relief under AEDPA only if his conviction in state court was based on an
“objectively unreasonable” application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This Comment
argues that the AEDPA standard of review effectively raises the bar for individuals to
successfully invoke their right to counsel above what Davis requires, even outside the habeas
context. This means that AEDPA’s procedural standard of review has effected a shift in
substantive law, even if courts did not intend that shift. To remedy this skewing of
substantive law, this Comment proposes that the Court should discourage trial and directreview courts from basing their decisions on AEDPA cases.

INTRODUCTION
“I think I would like to talk to a lawyer.”1 “Could I call my lawyer?”2
“I think I need a lawyer.”3 “I think I might want an attorney.”4 “I think
maybe I need to talk to a lawyer.”5 “I don’t think I want to say anything
more until I talk to a lawyer.”6
A layperson hearing, reading, or speaking any of these phrases might
reasonably understand them as requests for an attorney, which, in a
police interrogation, would bar all further questioning without the
presence of counsel.7 However, courts have determined each of these

1. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2001).
3. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 195 (4th Cir. 2000).
4. State v. Ellison, 140 P.3d 899, 910 (Ariz. 2006).
5. State v. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142, 151 (Wis. 2002).
6. United States v. Williams, No. 5:08-CR-174-FL-1, 2009 WL 497143, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 28,
2009).
7. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that an in-custody criminal
suspect, having invoked his right to counsel, “is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
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phrases to be inadequate to invoke the right to counsel, and they are part
of a long list of similar phrases deemed insufficient.8
The rights of a criminal suspect established in Miranda v. Arizona9
are deeply ingrained in the American popular consciousness.10 Virtually
anyone who has watched a contemporary police drama will know that
suspects under arrest have a “right to remain silent,”11 and that they have
a right to a lawyer present during interrogation, whether or not they can
afford one.12 Most people likely do not know, however, how a suspect
invokes his right to counsel. It turns out that doing so is fairly difficult.
The central reason for this difficulty arises from Davis v. United
States.13 In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that police are
free to question a suspect until he “clearly requests an attorney.”14
Applying this “clear and unequivocal request” rule, courts have often
interpreted the phrases uttered by suspects as questions or comments
about counsel, even when a layperson might interpret them as requests
for counsel.15 Phrases that employ tentative words, such as “might” or
“could,” tend to fall short of the Davis “clear request” standard.16
Exacerbating this trend is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),17 which imposes an extremely
deferential standard for review of state court convictions by federal
courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction.18 Under AEDPA, federal

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police”).
8. See, e.g., 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 859 n.166 (3d ed. 2007) (listing
dozens of phrases deemed insufficient to invoke); Jon M. Sands & Kim Smith-Stout, Articulating
Miranda, in THE CHAMPION, Dec. 2005, at 24–25 (listing several more phrases).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (stating that the Miranda warnings
have “become part of our national culture”).
11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
12. Id. at 474. But see Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204–05 (2010) (holding
that Miranda warnings need not expressly include notification that the suspect may have a lawyer
present during interrogation) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198, 203–05 (1989)).
13. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
14. Id. at 461.
15. See, e.g., Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Could I call my
lawyer?”); see also Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1011, 1034–47 (2007) (analyzing how courts have treated numerous questions and statements about
counsel after Davis).
16. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1040–43 (extensively examining what causes a statement or
question to be equivocal for the purposes of Davis and listing examples).
17. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
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courts cannot overturn a state court’s conviction unless the state court
rendered “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.”19 This entirely novel standard of
review means that when a court decides a case under AEDPA, it is not
saying what the law is; rather it is saying what the limit of the law is.
That is, it is saying what constitutes a patent transgression of the law,
and not how the law itself should be applied.
The distinction is crucial. As federal habeas courts have interpreted
state Miranda rulings20 through AEDPA’s highly deferential prism, they
have left undisturbed lower-court decisions holding phrases to be
inadequate to invoke—phrases the habeas court might otherwise call a
valid invocation. This process creates a body of invocation pseudoprecedent. That is, precedent that does not precisely state whether a
phrase invokes the right to counsel, but instead explains that it was not
an outright transgression of the law to hold that it did not invoke. That
pseudo-precedent is then cited by state and federal courts reviewing
purported invocations de novo, which are sometimes themselves cycled
through the AEDPA filter. The final outcome of the interplay between
Davis and AEDPA has been a shift in substantive law: a whittling away
of the acceptable phrases for invoking the right to counsel to only the
most obvious.21 That is, a suspect is effectively required to say nothing
other than the magic words, “I want a lawyer.”
This Comment analyzes what I will call AEDPA’s “ratchet effect” on
the standard for invoking the Miranda right to counsel. Part I examines
the Court’s approach to the right to counsel before 1994. Part II
discusses the Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, and Part III
explains the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, its history,
and its deferential standard of review. Part IV discusses in detail the
effect AEDPA has had on invocation jurisprudence, and examines two

19. Id.
20. Those rulings cut strongly against defendants. According to a 2007 study, courts have
determined that the suspect did not unambiguously invoke the right some eighty-one percent of the
time. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1055 (examining 391 cases discussing Davis between 1994 and
2006). But see id. at 1034 (noting that clear and unambiguous invocations of the right to counsel
may never reach appellate review). On habeas review, where only roughly one percent of petitions
are successful, a lower rate of invocations deemed adequate is a statistical certainty. See John H.
Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 284 (2006) (analyzing the
success rate of AEDPA petitions).
21. See, e.g., infra notes 192–207 and accompanying text (examining Burket v. Angelone, 208
F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2000), in which the phrase, “I think I need a lawyer,” has been cited in at least
twenty-eight cases to reject similar claimed invocations).
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illustrative cases with a quantitative analysis of their effects. Finally,
Part V proposes that the Court should discourage lower courts from
basing their decisions on AEDPA precedent except when they apply
AEDPA themselves.
I.

IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
WITHOUT STATING HOW IT IS INVOKED

Access to legal representation is a key value of American criminal
law. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution specifically requires that
all criminal defendants have access to an attorney during trial.22 This
was in part a reaction to English law of the mid-to-late 1700s, which
barred assistance of counsel in most criminal cases.23 Today, of course,
the assistance of counsel is considered a fundamental part of any
criminal proceeding in any American court. For its part, the U.S.
Supreme Court has protected the Sixth Amendment right to counsel with
a steadiness that is rare in constitutional criminal procedure.24 Beginning
in the 1930s, the Court began expanding the right to counsel by setting
standards for counsel’s performance25 and strengthening waiver
requirements.26
The Court has since reached beyond the Sixth Amendment to hold
that, as a Fifth Amendment matter, a criminal defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel in an adversarial setting even outside the
courtroom, namely police interrogations. In Miranda v. Arizona,27 the
Court applied to interrogations the Sixth Amendment notion that a
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. See Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1637–41 (2003).
24. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482–83 (2010) (holding that
right to effective assistance of counsel applies where deportation is the potential penalty); United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (Scalia, J.) (noting that right to counsel rises
above right to a fair trial, incorporates right to choice of counsel); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (stating that right to effective counsel applies at plea stage); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463–65 (1938) (holding that right to
counsel may only be forfeited by a knowing and intelligent waiver); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932) (holding that criminal defendants have a right to effective counsel in certain capital
cases). But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1976) (setting a high standard for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).
25. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (holding that the right to counsel is the right to effective counsel in
certain capital cases).
26. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463–65 (imposing a knowing-and-intelligent-waiver requirement).
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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layperson would need an attorney to navigate a complicated and
imposing legal system,28 requiring that accused persons be afforded
access to counsel, if requested.29 It would be nearly thirty years,
however, before the Court stated how a suspect should invoke the right
to counsel that it articulated in Miranda.30
A.

Miranda v. Arizona Established a Post-Arrest Right to Counsel for
Criminal Suspects

The ruling of Miranda v. Arizona is quite familiar.31 Barring certain
key exceptions,32 a criminal suspect in police custody must be informed
of his or her right to remain silent and to consult an attorney.33 The Court
designed the Miranda holdings to protect a criminal suspect’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the concern being that a
suspect in police custody may feel coerced into incriminating himself.34
Because of that concern, once a suspect invokes one of the Miranda
rights, police questioning must cease.35 After a suspect invokes his right
to counsel, questioning may resume only when the suspect has a lawyer
present,36 when fourteen days pass after release from custody,37 or when
the suspect himself reinitiates communication.38 Otherwise, the police
may not ask the suspect any more questions, and any of the suspect’s
statements taken in contravention of the rule are inadmissible in court.39
Miranda has come under fire from many angles. Legal commentators
have attacked Miranda for years,40 and politicians have long expressed
28. See id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s holdings] derive from quotation and
analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth Amendment, which should properly have no
bearing on police interrogation.”)
29. Id. at 467, 469, 471, 473 (majority opinion).
30. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (holding that a suspect must
unambiguously and unequivocally request counsel).
31. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[Miranda] warnings have become
part of our national culture.”).
32. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (carving out an exception to
Miranda warnings when public safety is threatened).
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–69, 471–72.
34. Id. at 469–70.
35. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74.
36. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85.
37. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010).
38. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85.
39. Id. at 485–87.
40. See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1985)
(proposing Miranda be overruled); see also Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False
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discontent with the opinion.41 Congress reacted to the decision by
passing the Crime Control Bill, which attempted to effectively overrule
Miranda in federal courts.42 As early as 1974, the Court itself expressed
concern that the Miranda ruling went beyond constitutional
requirements.43 By the mid-1980s, the Court, especially under Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, had begun to scale back Miranda’s
protections by making it more difficult for a suspect to invoke the right
to counsel44 and limiting the contexts in which the Miranda rights
attach.45 More recently, the Roberts Court has demonstrated its own
antipathy to Miranda by siding with the government in three major cases
concerning the definition of custody,46 the standard for invocation of
Miranda rights,47 and the now-familiar warnings police must give to
suspects.48 Yet, Miranda and its progeny survive.49
Confessions and Lost Confessions—And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 502–
03 (1998) (arguing Miranda has created high social costs in the form of lost confessions); Paul G.
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful
Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1126–32 (1998) (arguing that Miranda has
had substantial social costs in its limitations on police and prosecutors).
41. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 377 (2011) (quoting Richard Nixon describing Miranda as a “legal
technicalit[y]” that had “very nearly rule[d] out the ‘confession’ as an effective . . . tool in . . . law
enforcement”).
42. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, title II,
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 210 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)). In 2000, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down the Act to the extent that it conflicted with Miranda. Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (determining that Miranda announced a constitutional rule,
and that Congress had intended to impermissibly overturn that rule).
43. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (“[Miranda’s] procedural safeguards [are]
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”).
44. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1987) (holding that a suspect’s refusal to make
a written statement without a lawyer did not prevent taking an oral statement).
45. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984) (carving out a “public safety” exception to
the Miranda warnings requirement).
46. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (holding that after a break
in custody of fourteen days, “coercive effect” dissolves); see also Howes v. Fields, No. 10-680
(U.S. argued Oct. 4, 2011) (considering, under AEDPA standard of review, whether prisoner is
always in custody for purposes of Miranda when isolated from prison population); but see J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402–03 (2011) (holding by a five to four majority
that a child’s age may be taken into account when determining custody for purposes of Miranda).
47. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256, 2259–60 (2010) (holding that a
suspect’s three-hour silence did not invoke right to silence), reh’g denied, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 33,
177 (2010).
48. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1206 (2010) (holding that police need not use
specific language in the warning, so long as they convey Miranda’s essential messages). For more
on the current court’s outlook regarding Miranda, see generally Kinports, supra note 41.
49. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (refusing
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The Court Placed Greater Protections on the Right to Counsel
than on the Right to Silence

Miranda articulated two rights of criminal suspects subjected to
police interrogation: the right to silence and the right to counsel.50 These
rights do not accrue automatically, however. Rather, a suspect must
invoke his rights to silence and counsel by communicating his desire to
invoke them to his interrogators.51 How a suspect invokes those rights is
rarely clear, and it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Despite their
common origin, the Court has treated the Miranda rights to silence and
to counsel differently, arguably offering more protection to the right to
counsel.
In invocation jurisprudence, there are two central questions: what
constitutes an invocation, and how must police behave once a right is
invoked?52 Miranda held that an individual effectively invokes his right
to remain silent when he “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,” at which point
“the interrogation must cease.”53 After this, however, the Court did not
clarify the meaning of the phrase “indicates in any manner” for close to
thirty years.54
In the meantime, the Court elaborated on “the interrogation must
cease” in Michigan v. Mosley,55 holding that police must “scrupulously
honor[]” a suspect’s rights after he has indicated a desire to remain
silent.56 The Court identified six factors to determine whether the police
had scrupulously honored the suspect’s rights: (1) how quickly police
ceased questioning after the suspect invoked his right to silence; (2) the
amount of time that elapsed before questioning resumed; (3) whether the
suspect was advised of his Miranda rights again before questioning
resumed; (4) whether the same or different officers conducted the second
interrogation; (5) whether the topic of the second interrogation was the
same as the first; and (6) the location of the second interrogation.57
to overrule Miranda).
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68, 473 (1966).
51. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60 (invocations must be affirmative, verbal communication).
52. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 461 (1994) (requiring suspects to invoke
unambiguously, but declining to require police to clarify ambiguous requests).
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74.
54. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (holding that a suspect must unambiguously and unequivocally
request counsel).
55. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
56. Id. at 104 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See id. at 104–05.
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The Mosley analysis was the Court’s only significant guidance on the
right to silence until 2010. In Berghuis v. Thompkins,58 it held that a
suspect’s three-hour silence in the face of police questioning did not
constitute an invocation.59 In so holding, the Court answered the first
invocation question: what constitutes an invocation? The Court imposed
a “clear and unequivocal request” rule, holding that the suspect had not
invoked the right, and therefore Mosley was inapplicable.60
As for the right to counsel, the Court also offered little early guidance
on the first question, which Berghuis had answered for the right to
silence: what constitutes an invocation? Miranda was clear that “the
interrogation must cease” when a suspect “states that he wants an
attorney,”61 but it did not clarify how that request should be made, nor
whether or when the interrogation may resume. The Court did not
answer the first question until 1994 in Davis v. United States,62 which is
examined in Part II.
In Edwards v. Arizona,63 however, the Court directly answered the
second question: how must police behave after a suspect invokes his
right to counsel?64 The Court articulated a bright-line rule barring further
questioning after an invocation, until counsel is provided or the suspect
reinitiates communication.65 In Edwards, a suspect in police custody
indicated that he wanted to “make a deal,” but only with an attorney
present, at which point the interrogation stopped.66 The next morning,
however, the police resumed interrogation without providing a lawyer,
and the suspect implicated himself in the crime, leading to his
conviction.67
The facts in Edwards were similar to those in Mosley. As in Mosley,
the officer initially cut off questioning immediately after Edwards
invoked his Miranda rights (this time to counsel), there was a significant
lapse of time before the second interrogation, the officers in the second

58. 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
59. Id. at 2258, 2260.
60. Id. at 2260.
61. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. The Miranda decision also stated that questioning must cease
when the suspect “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” Id. at 444–45.
62. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
63. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
64. See id. at 485.
65. Id. at 484–85.
66. Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 479.
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interrogation were different from the original questioning officer, and
they warned him of his Miranda rights before beginning the second
interrogation.68 Additionally, the second group of officers directly
refused to honor Edwards’ request to remain silent.69 Yet, the Court did
not apply Mosley’s flexible “scrupulously honored” rule. Rather, when
Edwards challenged the use of his statements at trial, the Court held that
“an accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him.”70 The Edwards holding
created a “rigid prophylactic rule,”71 barring all further questioning after
a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel until an attorney is
present.72 Edwards had no effect on the right to silence, however, which
is still governed by Mosley’s more flexible “scrupulously honored”
analysis, in which the passage of time and other factors mitigate the
effect of an invocation of the right to silence.73
Having established a “rigid prophylactic rule,” the Edwards Court
went on to strengthen it by answering a third question: what constitutes a
waiver? The Court held that merely responding to police questioning
after invoking the right to counsel does not establish a waiver, even if
police re-advise the suspect of his rights.74 Rather, questioning cannot
continue without counsel present “unless the accused himself initiates
further communication . . . with the police.”75 Thus, Edwards made clear
that the right to counsel is well protected and that once invoked, it
triggers a procedural safeguard more rigid than the one articulated in
Mosley for the right to silence.76
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 484–85.
71. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85.
73. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975) (using six factors to determine whether
police scrupulously honored a suspect’s rights); see also Strauss, supra note 15, at 1020–21
(examining the more stringent effect of a right-to-counsel invocation, as compared to the right to
silence under Mosley).
74. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
75. Id. at 484–85.
76. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2275 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)) (“To the extent Mosley
contemplates a more flexible form of prophylaxis than Edwards—and, in particular, does not
categorically bar police from reapproaching a suspect who has invoked his right to remain silent—
Davis’ concern about wholly irrational obstacles to police investigation applies with less force.”).
(internal quotation marks omitted)
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In Edwards, the Court Did Not Make Clear What a Suspect Must
Say to Invoke the Right to Counsel nor What Police Should Do
When Faced with an Unclear Invocation

The Edwards ruling left unanswered the question how a suspect must
“express[] his desire to deal with the police only through counsel.”77
Neither did Edwards answer the question of how police should proceed
when faced with a statement that might be an invocation.
In response, state and federal courts developed three main approaches
to address unclear invocations in the thirteen years before the U.S.
Supreme Court stepped in.78 The first and broadest approach, embraced
primarily by the Sixth Circuit, held that any statement that could be
construed as a request for counsel validly invokes the right such that the
interrogation must cease.79 Other courts developed a narrow approach in
which only very clear requests for counsel would require police officers
to immediately cease questioning under Edwards, and the police were
free to ignore any ambiguous requests.80 Most federal courts, however,
took a middle approach (or clarification approach) in which officers
faced with an ambiguous request must ask only questions intended to

77. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85; see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95–96 (1984) (per
curiam) (noting a division of the courts on the consequences of an ambiguous or equivocal
invocation, but declining to resolve it). Before 1994, the Court decided numerous cases surrounding
Miranda invocations, and right-to-counsel invocations in particular, but they were all intended to
clarify the Edwards decision, rather than extend a ruling dictating what authorities must do when
faced with an ambiguous waiver. See, e.g., Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 57–59 (1985) (deciding
Edwards’ applicability to pending cases); Smith, 469 U.S. at 98–99 (holding that a suspect’s postinvocation statements cannot be used to impute ambiguity onto the invocation); Solem v. Stumes,
465 U.S. 638, 650 (1984) (holding Edwards not retroactively applicable); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462
U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983) (explaining that a suspect initiates communication when he “evince[s] a
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation”).
78. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 456 (noting the three approaches).
79. See, e.g., Bailey v. Hamby, 744 F.2d 24, 26–27 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that suspect’s
statement “I’d like to talk to an attorney or something like that” was adequate to invoke) (emphasis
omitted); Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 203, 205–06 (6th Cir. 1978) (statement, “Maybe I should
have an attorney,” adequate to invoke; burden placed on state to establish waiver whenever
statement taken without counsel present); see also McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 799–801
(8th Cir. 1982) (statement that suspect’s brother “told me he thought I needed a lawyer, an attorney,
my brother did, and I didn’t really think I needed one, really and truly” a valid invocation).
80. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980) (holding that statements “Maybe
I ought to have an attorney,” “Maybe I need a lawyer,” or “Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney” did
not invoke); State v. Moore, 744 S.W.2d 479, 480–81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (statement “[M]aybe [I]
should have an attorney” did not invoke); see also Scott R. Goings, Comment, Ambiguous or
Equivocal Requests for Counsel in Custodial Interrogations After Davis v. United States, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 161, 161–63, 162 n.8 (1995) (discussing the “threshold of clarity approach”); Strauss, supra
note 15, at 1022–23 (discussing the three approaches).
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clarify whether or not the suspect actually desired counsel.81 Many state
courts favored this approach as well.82
While lower courts developed these three approaches, the U.S.
Supreme Court remained deferential to suspects in other areas of
Miranda law. In Smith v. Illinois,83 for example, the Court held that
police could not use a suspect’s responses to questioning after invoking
the right to counsel “to cast doubt on the adequacy of the initial request
itself,” saying such a practice is “intolerable.”84 The Court continued to
strengthen Edwards’ bright-line rule throughout the 1980s and into the
early 1990s. In Arizona v. Roberson,85 the Court held that a right-tocounsel invocation applies to all police questioning, not just to questions
about a particular offense.86 Two years later, in Minnick v. Mississippi,87
the Court clarified that Edwards bars police from “reinitiat[ing]
interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has
consulted with his attorney.”88 In each case before 1994, however, the
Court declined to resolve the questions of how clearly a suspect must
request counsel to validly invoke the right and what police should do in
the face of an ambiguous request.89

81. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1022–23, 1023 n.83 (citing numerous federal courts following the
clarification approach, along with one state court); see also United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284,
1287 (9th Cir. 1987) (FBI agents required to clarify suspect’s statement that he “might want to talk
to a lawyer”). The Ninth Circuit retained this approach even after Davis insofar as the ambiguous
statement was made before a Miranda waiver. United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1078–79
n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). It reasoned that because the express elimination in Davis of any clarification
requirement for police came in a case specifically limited to post-waiver scenarios, its clarification
rule was only partially abrogated. Id.; see also infra note 238 (discussing AEDPA’s effect on the
Fouche rule).
82. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 466–67 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing state
courts following the clarification approach); see also State v. Moulds, 673 P.2d 1074, 1082 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1983) (adopting the clarification approach).
83. 469 U.S. 91 (1984).
84. Id. at 98–99 (emphasis in original).
85. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
86. Id. at 677–78.
87. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
88. Id. at 153.
89. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 n.3 (1987) (declining to resolve the question of
how courts should treat ambiguous or equivocal invocations); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
91, 95–96 n.3 (1984) (per curiam) (noting a division of courts on the consequences of an ambiguous
or equivocal invocation, but declining to resolve it).
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II.

IN DAVIS V. UNITED STATES, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
ADOPTED A NARROW APPROACH TO RIGHT-TOCOUNSEL INVOCATIONS

The Court resolved both questions in 1994 when it decided Davis v.
United States,90 which signaled a shift toward placing the burden of
clarity in Miranda invocations onto suspects.91
A.

The Davis Decision Articulated a High Standard for How Clearly
Suspects Must Invoke the Miranda Right to Counsel.

In Davis v. United States, Davis, a member of the United States Navy,
was arrested in connection with the murder of a fellow sailor.92 Upon
learning of his involvement, Naval Investigative Service agents advised
Davis that he was a suspect in the killing, gave him warnings consistent
with both Miranda and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
proceeded to interview him.93 Davis waived his rights to silence and to
counsel, both orally and in writing.94 About ninety minutes into the
interview, Davis stated, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”95 At that
point, the agents re-advised Davis of his rights and told him the
interview would stop if he did indeed want a lawyer.96 Davis responded,
“No, I’m not asking for a lawyer . . . I don’t want a lawyer,” and the
interview continued.97 After another hour of interrogation, Davis said “I
think I want a lawyer before I say anything else,” at which point the
interview ceased.98 At his general court martial, the Military Judge
denied Davis’ motion to suppress the statements he had made after he
said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”99

90. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
91. See id. at 469–70 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633
n.6 (1986) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted) (noting that a concern about linguistic capacities of suspects “thrust” into
interrogation “has, in the past, dissuaded the Court from placing any burden of clarity upon
individuals in custody, but has led it instead to require that requests for counsel be given a broad,
rather than a narrow, interpretation”).
92. Id. at 454 (majority opinion).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 455.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.100 The Court held that “after a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement
officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly
requests an attorney.”101 The Court held that trial judges should assess
the clarity of the request under an objective inquiry “to avoid difficulties
of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting
interrogations.”102
Davis answered the first question left open in Edwards: how must a
suspect “state[] that he wants an attorney”?103 In her majority opinion,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor began by clarifying that the Miranda right
to counsel is not itself a constitutional right, but rather a procedural
safeguard designed to protect the constitutional right against selfincrimination.104 She recognized, however, that despite its protective
purpose, the Court had not yet made clear what sort of statement “can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance
of an attorney.”105 With that in mind, she set a new standard of clarity: a
“suspect must unambiguously request counsel . . . . [H]e must articulate
his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be
a request for an attorney.”106
The majority recognized that the new rule would disadvantage some

100. Id. at 462.
101. Id. at 461.
102. Id. at 458–59 (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987)). Some scholars have
noted that eliminating the intent element from an inquiry into linguistic meaning is a selfcontradiction. David Aram Kaiser & Paul Lufkin, Deconstructing Davis v. United States: Intention
and Meaning in Ambiguous Requests for Counsel, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 737, 755–56 (2005).
That is, it is impossible for there to be a truly objective inquiry into a request because that inquiry is
designed to discover the speaker’s subjective intent, and “every interpreter implicitly provides a
context and a hypothetical speaker’s intent.” Id. at 756–58. Moreover, it is absurd, they argue, to
require objective clarity of language when a speaker’s intent is plain. Id. at 747 (quoting Steven
Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Reply to John Searle, 25 NEW LITERARY HIST. 669, 671 (1994)).
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
104. Davis, 512 U.S. at 457 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1974)).
105. Id. at 459 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
106. Id. The Court limited the applicability of its new “clear and unequivocal request” rule, as it
has come to be called, to invocations made after the suspect had waived his Miranda rights. The
Court made this explicit in its holding: “We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless
the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461. The Court’s rationale also reflected this logic. It
reasoned that a suspect who had waived his rights “has indicated his willingness to deal with the
police unassisted.” Id. at 460–61. If the suspect later wants a lawyer present, the Court stated, it is
his burden to “affirmatively invoke[]” that right. Id. at 461.
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suspects “because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a
variety of other reasons.”107 However, the Court explained, the Miranda
warnings themselves are the primary protection, and “full
comprehension of the rights” suffices to counterbalance the coercive
effect of police interrogation.108 Thus, the Court held that it is the
warnings themselves—rather than facile invocation of the rights—that
constitute the substance of Miranda’s protection.109
Having answered the first question left open in Edwards, the Court
went on to answer the second: what must police do after an unclear
invocation? Justice O’Connor observed that a rule requiring police to
stop questioning whenever a suspect utters a statement that “might be a
request for an attorney” would soften the Edwards bright-line rule
requiring police to immediately cease questioning.110 It would, she
wrote, cloud its “clarity and ease of application” and undermine
effective law enforcement by introducing uncertainty into
interrogations.111 As such, the Court held that “after a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may
107. Id. at 460. In his concurrence, Justice Souter took particular umbrage at this likelihood,
using it to argue for a clarification rule. See id. at 469–70 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“A substantial percentage of [suspects] lack anything like a confident command of the English
language, many are ‘woefully ignorant,’ and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the
interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to
speak assertively will abandon them.”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468) (citations omitted). A
number of scholars have also seized on this as an injustice in Davis. E.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at
1030–31; Yale Kamisar, Constitutional Law Conference Addresses Supreme Court’s 1993-94 Term,
56 CRIM. L. REP. 1068–69 (1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of
Powerlessness in Police Interrogations, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 261 (1993). Certain subsequent cases
have borne out Justice Souter’s fears. See, e.g., Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1231–33, 1235
(10th Cir. 2000) (upholding that Mexican immigrant’s statement, “Yes, I understand it a little bit
and I sign it because I understand it something about a lawyer and he want to ask me questions and
that’s what I’m looking for a lawyer,” after signing Miranda waiver form and confessing, was
ambiguous on AEDPA review).
108. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
109. See id.
110. Id. at 461.
111. Id. (“The Edwards rule—questioning must cease if the suspect asks for a lawyer—provides
a bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation
without unduly hampering the gathering of information. But if we were to require questioning to
cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of
application would be lost. Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about
whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with the threat of
suppression if they guess wrong.”) (emphasis in original). Some have pointed out that this is
backwards logic. E.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at 1028–29. It introduces far more uncertainty to
require a clarity analysis, rather than simply imposing an across-the-board cutoff at all requests for
counsel, however ambiguous. Id.
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continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an
attorney.”112 The Court expressly declined to adopt a rule requiring
police to ask only clarifying questions after an ambiguous invocation.113
B.

Davis Became the Standard for Right-to-Counsel Invocations

Legal commentators widely attacked Davis. Some criticized the
decision for introducing into interrogations the very uncertainty that the
Court sought to avoid.114 Others argued that the rule would create a
disproportionate disadvantage for certain groups who, “by virtue of their
education, socio-economic background, gender or national origin are
virtually incapable of meeting such a standard of linguistic clarity.”115
Despite the scholarly criticism, most courts have followed Davis at
least to some extent, including the vast majority of state courts.116
Although federal courts are bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings,
some have limited Davis’ application to statements made after a suspect
has waived his Miranda rights.117 Certain state courts have declined to
follow Davis on state constitutional grounds. The highest courts in
Minnesota,118 Hawaii,119 New Jersey,120 and West Virginia121 have each
interpreted their own state constitutions as providing greater protection
to suspects than Davis would.122 Other state courts have established their
own limits to the Davis rule, such as rules allowing the consideration of
contextual factors in interpreting a purported invocation of the Miranda

112. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. Courts have often misinterpreted this express holding. See infra note
238
113. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–63. Four justices, led by Justice David Souter, advocated for the
clarification rule, arguing that it would have put the Court in line with the majority of federal
appellate courts. Id. at 466–67 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. See supra note 111.
115. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1027 (quoting Kaiser & Lufkin, supra note 102, at 756) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also id. at 1012 nn.10 & 11 (listing several articles
examining the possibility of disadvantages to certain groups); supra note 107 (discussing Justice
Souter’s prediction of this likelihood).
116. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1032.
117. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1078–79 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008).
118. State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 648–49 (Minn. 1999).
119. State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (Haw. 1994).
120. State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301, 1318 (N.J. 1997).
121. See State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 n.12 (W. Va. 1994) (reserving the question of whether
to apply Davis and expressing support for the clarification approach); see also State v. Bradshaw,
457 S.E.2d 456, 466 n.7 (W. Va. 1995) (same).
122. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1032.
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right to counsel.123
Two years after the Court decided Davis, which narrowed criminal
suspects’ rights prior to conviction, Congress passed a statute that
limited the relief available to state prisoners after conviction.
III. THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT CREATED A HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD FOR
FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE COURT CONVICTIONS
AEDPA, enacted by Congress in 1996,124 drastically altered the relief
available to state prisoners under the federal writ of habeas corpus. The
statute made it significantly more difficult for a federal court to overturn
a state court conviction.125 It did not produce this effect on its own,
however. Since the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court had been creating
procedural obstructions to the writ, making it increasingly “difficult for
state court inmates to thread the habeas needle.”126
A.

Before AEDPA, Federal Courts Reviewed Constitutional
Challenges to State Convictions De Novo

The writ of habeas corpus allows a person subject to confinement to
petition a court for a determination that the confinement is unjust.127
Prior to 1867, the Great Writ, as the federal writ of habeas corpus is
sometimes called,128 was only available to prisoners convicted in a

123. In State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 425 (R.I. 2000), for example, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island considered whether the question “Can I get a lawyer?” was a clear and unambiguous request
for counsel under Davis. In its analysis, the court noted that, depending on context, sometimes
questions are understood as requests (“Can I get some service over here?” said to a sales clerk) and
sometimes as simple questions (“Can I get a slice of pepperoni pizza?” said in a pizza parlor not
clearly selling pizza by the slice, or, for that matter, pepperoni pizza). Id. at 425 n.5. The court
remanded the case so that the trial court could consider the context of the question, including
responses from the interrogating officers. Id. at 425–26.
124. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006); see also Blume, supra note 20, at 284.
126. Blume, supra note 20, at 297; see also id. at 265–70 (explaining Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
antipathy to federal review of state convictions and listing cases restricting that review during his
time on the Court).
127. Margery I. Miller, Note, A Different View of Habeas: Interpreting AEDPA’s “Adjudicated
on the Merits” Clause When Habeas Corpus Is Understood As an Appellate Function of the Federal
Courts, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2593, 2606 (2004).
128. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 3, 3 (2009).
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federal court.129 The federal government arrogated to itself the power to
grant the writ to state prisoners in its post-Civil War backlash against
state power.130 Congress lodged that power in the federal courts with the
passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.131 The modern history of
habeas corpus law, however, begins with Brown v. Allen,132 which
established that federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions
was de novo for pure and mixed questions of federal constitutional
law.133
The next watershed moment in the evolution of the habeas standard of
review came in 1989. In Teague v. Lane,134 the Court held that federal
courts could not entertain habeas claims that ask the court to expand
federal constitutional rights.135 The result was that federal habeas corpus
cases could not contribute to the development of criminal law, except in
the rarest of cases.136 In one sense, Teague can be seen as a precursor to
AEDPA insofar as it required that habeas courts not announce
constitutional rules “not dictated by precedent.”137 This admonition was
later clarified to mean that not even a modest extension of existing
precedent was allowed, but, unlike AEDPA, there was no restriction to
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.138 Still, even in its moments of antipathy
toward federal habeas review of state court convictions,139 the Court left
untouched the de novo standard for reviewing state courts’ application of
established federal constitutional law.140
129. Miller, supra note 127, at 2606.
130. See id. at 2606–07.
131. Id.
132. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
133. Brown, 344 U.S. at 467–74 (giving de novo review to a question of federal constitutional
law); id. at 507 (Frankfurter, J.) (“[S]o-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge.”); Miller, supra
note 127, at 2607–08; see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299–301 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (discussing the “certainty with which Brown v. Allen rejected a deferential standard of
review of issues of law”).
134. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
135. Id. at 310; Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under
the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1870 (1997).
136. Note, supra note 135, at 1870.
137. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
138. Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 604 (2009).
139. See Blume, supra note 20, at 265–70 (listing cases restricting habeas review during
Rehnquist’s time on the Court).
140. See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (stating that the preclusive effect of a
jury verdict is a question of federal law reviewed de novo).
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Congress Intended AEDPA’s Standard of Review to Minimize
Federal Involvement in State Court Convictions

AEDPA imposed an entirely novel standard of review on federal
courts exercising habeas jurisdiction. Among many other provisions,141
AEDPA’s habeas section—part of a much larger bill—includes what
became 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which provides that a federal court
sitting in habeas jurisdiction may not overturn a state decision merely
because that decision is incorrect.142 Rather, AEDPA requires that a
federal habeas court ask whether the state court’s opinion is “contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,” U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.143 Where there is no U.S. Supreme Court decision on point,
there can be no precedent to unreasonably apply, and the conviction
must stand.144 Congressional proponents intended this highly deferential
standard of review to expedite justice and minimize federal involvement
in settled state court convictions.145
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole introduced the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act on April 27, 1995, eight days after the
Oklahoma City bombing and roughly two weeks after he announced he
would seek the presidency.146 Referring to the bombing, Senator Dole
told Congress that the bill would ensure “that those who committed this
evil deed will get what they deserve—punishment that is swift, certain,
and severe.”147 Title VII of Senator Dole’s bill addressed the federal writ
of habeas corpus as applied to state prisoners, while its other sections
141. See Blume, supra note 20, at 270–74 (discussing AEDPA’s sections creating a statue of
limitations, barring successive petitions, exhaustion requirements, etc.).
142. Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong with
It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 926 (2001); Krystal M. Moore, Comment, Is Saving an
Innocent Man a “Fool’s Errand”? The Limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act on an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 197, 206–07 (2011).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
144. See id.; Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that where the U.S.
Supreme Court has expressly left a question open, it cannot be “clearly established” and courts
applying AEDPA must affirm).
145. See 141 CONG. REC. S7808 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (AEDPA
would prevent “incessant, frivolous appeals ad [infinitum]”); id. at S7839 (statement of Sen. Cohen)
(“So let us not fool ourselves. The substantive changes to the habeas bill being proposed are not
designed just to eliminate frivolous cases. They are designed to weaken the [f]ederal courts’ role in
scrutinizing [s]tate court verdicts for constitutional error.”).
146. 141 CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); David Johnston,
At Least 31 Are Dead, Scores Are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story
Federal Office Building, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A1; Dan Balz, Dole Begins 3rd Bid for
White House, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1995, at A1.
147. 141 CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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related to strengthening law enforcement and combating terrorism.148
President Bill Clinton signed the final version of the bill on April 24,
1996, the effective date of the law.149 The Conference Committee report
accompanying the final version focuses primarily on the procedural
elements of the habeas provision.150 It only briefly mentions the new
standard of review, saying, “[The bill] requires deference to the
determinations of state courts that are neither ‘contrary to,’ nor an
‘unreasonable application of,’ clearly established federal law.”151 This is
the report’s only mention of the new standard of review,152 although the
provision has had a profound effect on the adjudication of federal habeas
petitions.153
148. Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong. §§ 701–08 (as
introduced, Apr. 27, 1995). Dole’s bill, S. 735, incorporated verbatim the language of the latest
iteration of a twenty-seven-page bill introduced a month earlier by Sen. Arlen Specter, which, like
its previous versions, had languished in committee. Compare Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995,
S. 623, 104th Cong. (as introduced, Mar. 24, 1995), with S. 735. Dole’s bill, however, included an
additional 126 pages, mostly geared at fighting terrorism, and a new title. S.735, §§ 101–601,
§§ 721–901. The bill passed the Senate six weeks later by a vote of 91 to 8, the habeas corpus
section largely untouched. 141 CONG. REC. S7857, S7868–71 (daily ed. June 7, 1995);
Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong. §§ 601–08 (as passed by
Senate June 7, 1995).
Notably, then-Senator Joe Biden was vocally opposed to the bill, including its novel standard of
review, which he called “a heck of a standard to have to apply.” 141 CONG. REC. S7841 (daily ed.
June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). Senator Biden, who had lost his chairmanship of the Senate
Judiciary Committee a few months prior, was especially concerned about the elimination of the
right to counsel in habeas proceedings and the fact that the bill would “make[] sweeping changes in
the rules of the game.” Id. at S7812–13. Others were concerned that the “deference provision”
would effectively “repeal the habeas corpus statute.” Id. at S7839 (statement of Sen. Cohen)
(quoting Professor Henry Monaghan). Perhaps hoping Dole’s bill would suffer the same fate as
Specter’s, Senator Biden first proposed amending the bill to remove the “95 percent of [it]” that was
“not germane” to habeas corpus reform, leaving only those provisions dealing with federal
prisoners. Id. at S7806. Biden later went so far as to introduce an amendment to eliminate the
“deference rule.” Id. at S7840. He was joined in his opposition by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
who stated outright, “This legislation will eviscerate the writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Id. at S7878–9
(statement of Sen. Moynihan). Ultimately, Senator Biden voted for the bill, while Moynihan did not.
Id. at S7857.
149. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996). When he signed the bill, President Clinton noted the
concern of its detractors and suggested that he would not have signed it if he thought courts would
“interpret [it] in a manner that would undercut meaningful [f]ederal habeas corpus review.” Id. at
631. He also raised the same constitutional concerns that have come up since. Id.; see also infra
notes 171–174 and accompanying text.
150. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-518 (1996) (Conf. rep.).
151. Id. at 111.
152. See id.
153. See Adelman, supra note 128, at 15–20 (Judge Adelman discussing the effect that AEDPA’s
deference provisions have had both in his court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and in the
federal judiciary generally). But see Blume, supra note 20, at 261 (arguing that AEDPA has not had
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For all of its import, § 2254, generally considered the “centerpiece of
AEDPA,”154 is often described as “vague.”155 The U.S. Supreme Court
has made some effort to clarify it. Referring to the much-discussed
§ 2254, it offered this formulation in Brown v. Payton156:
A state-court decision is contrary to this Court’s clearly
established precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of
facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of this
Court but reaches a different result. A state-court decision
involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s clearly
established precedents if the state court applies this Court’s
precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.157
The Court has made several other attempts to clarify how courts
should apply § 2254.158 In Williams v. Taylor,159 for example, the Court
interpreted the phrases “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of”
found in the statute.160 The Court suggested that AEDPA created an
entirely novel standard of review.161 Justice Stevens explained that the
statutory text does not identify a familiar standard of review such as “de
novo” or “plain error.”162 “Rather, the text is fairly read simply as a
command that a federal court not issue the habeas writ unless the state
the profound effect that its proponents and detractors expected).
154. Blume, supra note 20, at 272.
155. E.g. LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 57 (2003) (“AEDPA is
notorious for its poor drafting. The Act is replete with vague and ambiguous language, apparent
inconsistency, and plain bad grammar.”); James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”?
AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 426 (2001) (“AEDPA
complicates review . . . because of its poor drafting.”). The Court itself has expressed dismay at the
vagueness of the statute’s drafting. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (“All we can say is
that in a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory
drafting.”).
156. 544 U.S. 133 (2005).
157. Id. at 141 (citations omitted).
158. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783–87 (2011) (quoting
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)) (analyzing the phrases “contrary to” and
“unreasonable application of”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–13 (2000) (same); see also
Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory
Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 699 (2003) (pointing out that
Williams’ value is undermined by a split in the decision in discussions surrounding the rule
articulated and its proper application).
159. 529 U.S. 362.
160. Id. at 402–13.
161. Id. at 385 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
162. Id. Stevens was not writing for a majority in that section of his opinion. Id. at 367. The
majority, however, echoed his logic. Id. at 404 (majority opinion).
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court was wrong as a matter of law or unreasonable in its application of
law in a given case.”163 Stevens wrote that in so commanding, Congress
expressed a “mood” that state court decisions must be reviewed with the
utmost care and deference.164
The Court recently strengthened the instruction in Williams v. Taylor
that federal habeas courts should give substantial deference to state
decisions. In Harrington v. Richter,165 the Court emphasized that habeas
corpus review is only “a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems,”166 stating:
If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant
to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of
imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims
already rejected in state proceedings. It preserves authority to
issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded
jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts
with this Court’s precedents. It goes no farther.167
Justice O’Connor warned in Williams that defining the “unreasonable
application” provision with reference to a “reasonable jurist” does not
mean a decision is valid merely because “at least one of the [n]ation’s
jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state
court did.”168 This admonition is not always followed, however.169
Federal courts have sometimes strained against the strictness of the
§ 2254 standard, especially where the outcome seems unjust. For
example, in Irons v. Carey,170 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court’s granting of a writ of habeas corpus to
a prisoner denied release by a state parole board.171 The court reluctantly
adhered to AEDPA’s standard and held that the parole board’s ruling
was reasonable, despite the district court’s ruling to the contrary.172 All
163. Id. at 385 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
164. Id. at 386 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)).
165. 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011).
166. Id. at 786 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. (citations omitted)
168. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410.
169. Adelman, supra note 128, at 16–17 (lamenting the fact that this “unfortunate side effect[]”
of AEDPA “drives constitutional protections for criminal defendants down to the lowest common
denominator”).
170. 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d
546, 555 (9th Cir. 2010).
171. Id. at 854.
172. Id. at 852 (“Although we agree with the district court that the other bases for the Board’s
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three members of the panel wrote separate concurrences.173 Two decried
AEDPA as nearly unconstitutional insofar as Congress was
“determin[ing] how a federal court shall decide a case.”174 The Fifth
Circuit has also expressed its frustration with AEDPA:
It is beyond regrettable that a possibly innocent man will not
receive a new trial in the face of the preposterously unreliable
testimony of the victim and sole eyewitness to the crime for
which he was convicted. But, our hands are tied by AEDPA . . . ,
so we dutifully dismiss his claim.175
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has reversed at least a dozen
circuit court decisions granting habeas writs in spite of what the Court
viewed as “clearly established [f]ederal law.”176 Finally, until 2003 the
Ninth Circuit had applied its own approach to AEDPA, requiring federal
courts in that circuit to review the state court’s decision de novo prior to
applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.177 The Court
expressly overturned this approach.178
IV. AEDPA’S STANDARD OF REVIEW CREATES A ONE-WAY
RATCHET AGAINST SUSPECTS’ MIRANDA RIGHTS
The AEDPA standard of review directs federal courts to state whether
another court’s application of the Davis “clear and unequivocal request”
rule was reasonable, rather than apply the Davis rule itself. This creates a
kind of pseudo-precedent that does not really state the law, but instead
states what is not an “unreasonable application of the law,” a distinction

unsuitability determination . . . were wholly unsupported by ‘some evidence,’ . . . we are unable to
conclude that the Board’s findings regarding the nature of the commitment offense were without
some evidentiary support.”)
173. Id. at 854–59 (Noonan, J., concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially); id. at
859–60 (Fernandez, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 854 (Noonan, J., concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially).
175. Kinsel v. Cain, 647 F.3d 265, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2011).
176. Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 138, at 595.
177. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). The Ninth Circuit had been following the rule
in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000), which required that courts first decide
whether or not the decision under review was in error, and then proceed to the question of whether
the decision was “reasonable.” In so holding, it alluded to problems of obscuring constitutional
jurisprudence and its role in providing guidance to state courts. Id. (“Requiring federal courts to first
determine whether the state court’s decision was erroneous, prior to considering whether it was
contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of controlling law under AEDPA, promotes
clarity in our own constitutional jurisprudence and also provides guidance for state courts, which
can look to our decisions for their persuasive value.”).
178. Id.
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trial and direct-review courts often fail to note. That pseudo-precedent,
extremely deferential to state courts, will almost always favor the
prosecution, holding state-court rejections of right to counsel invocations
were “reasonable.” As illustrated by a quantitative analysis of two cases
below, other courts not applying AEDPA then rely on that pseudoprecedent over and over again to reject purported invocations.
Ultimately, what was originally a statement of what was not an
unreasonable application of Davis becomes a substantive definition of a
clear and unequivocal request. These phenomena, working in tandem,
create a one-way ratchet, narrowing the phrases that can invoke the right
to counsel.
A.

AEDPA Has Led Federal Courts to Narrow the Davis Rule for
Invoking the Miranda Right to Counsel

Under AEPDA, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal
courts reviewing state court convictions do not directly apply the
relevant law.179 Rather, AEDPA directs them to ascertain what the law
is, as determined by the Court, and then decide whether the state court’s
interpretation falls within the reasonable limits of the law’s
application.180 Therefore, in the right-to-counsel context, federal courts
applying AEDPA to state prisoners’ habeas petitions must ask whether
an invocation could possibly be construed as ambiguous or equivocal.
Framing the question this way begs an affirmative answer.
It is important to understand the magnitude of deference that AEDPA
requires, as compared to a de novo standard, and it bears repeating here.
Courts applying AEDPA are powerless to identify rights and limitations
on their own and to use glosses on the law established by lower courts.
Under an ordinary de novo standard of review, a federal court could ask,
“What is the law as this circuit sees it, and how should it apply here?”
Under AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” standard, the court may
only ask, “Is this interpretation of law an absolutely impermissible
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent?”181 If the state court decision
at issue is not absolutely impermissible, the court applying AEDPA must
affirm.182 This subtlety is often lost on courts not applying AEDPA.183
179. Id.
180. Id. at 73.
181. See id. at 75 (“The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be
more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application of clearly established law must be
objectively unreasonable.” (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 410 (2000)).
182. See id. In making that analysis, courts applying AEDPA look to other interpretations to
determine what is reasonable. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600–01 (2000). If they look to
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For that reason, the difference between the de novo standard (defining
the law) and the AEDPA standard (defining the limits of the law) sets
the stage for shift in substantive law.
The AEDPA standard poses a significant risk of narrowing the
Miranda right to counsel in its interplay with Davis v. United States.184
AEDPA creates a one-way ratchet effect, narrowing the set of phrases
considered effective to invoke a suspect’s right to counsel to only the
most obvious. This occurs as follows: first, a federal court is presented
with a case in which a constitutionally questionable (but not “objectively
unreasonable”) invocation decision resulted in a conviction, and affirms
it under the § 2254(d)(1) standard of review, although it might not have
under a de novo standard. Then, when that case is published, it becomes
precedent that is cited by lower courts to reach similar conclusions on
the merits of invocation cases.
To illustrate these two steps, we can look to an individual phrase. In
the first step, a state court rejects a given phrase as a right-to-counsel
invocation, and a federal habeas court gives deference to that rejection.
A criminal suspect taken into custody makes a reference to counsel
during or prior to his interrogation (for example, “Could I get a
lawyer?”). Police, hoping to get a confession, do not interpret the
reference as a request and continue questioning. When the interrogation
continues, the suspect makes incriminating statements. Those statements
are admitted at trial, with the state court determining that the suspect’s
reference to counsel was not “clear and unequivocal” under Davis,185
and the defendant is convicted. After exhausting state court remedies,186
the convict petitions in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus,
pursuant to AEDPA. The federal court, despite its reluctance to support
the state court’s interpretation of Davis, is constrained by § 2254. The
federal habeas court is bound to deny the petition if it determines that the
state court’s application of Davis was not objectively unreasonable.187
The second step effectuates the substantive change in law, and turns

other AEDPA cases affirming something at the outside edges of “reasonableness,” there is a strong
risk that the edge could be pushed even further.
183. See, e.g., People v. Kamyab, No. B187608, 2007 WL 1492257, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23,
2007) (citing AEDPA cases but ignoring the AEDPA dimension of the holdings).
184. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
185. See id. at 461 (“[L]aw enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the
suspect clearly requests an attorney.”).
186. Exhaustion is a required element of an AEDPA habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)
(2006).
187. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).
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the ratchet. Here, the federal court’s Davis holding becomes precedent—
or, more precisely, pseudo-precedent—that state courts cite without
reference to the standard of review. When a new and perhaps clearer
phrase (such as, “Can I get my lawyer?”) enters the cycle at the state
court level, prosecutors seeking a conviction find and point to the earlier
AEDPA case that deemed insufficient the phrase, “Could I get a
lawyer?” The state court, without parsing the standard of review, looks
to that earlier AEDPA decision as persuasive authority to deny the new
defendant’s motion to suppress his incriminating statements, and the
defendant is convicted. The new phrase (“Can I get my lawyer?”) then
enters federal court in an AEDPA habeas petition, becoming its own
pseudo-precedent, and the process begins anew.
AEDPA’s ratchet effect only goes one way. A federal court applying
AEDPA is deciding not what the law is, but what the limits are for a
reasonable application of the law. When it decides those limits in the
context of right-to-counsel invocations, it will always be considering
phrases that were not clear enough to halt the interrogation in the first
place.188 Because only convicts can seek habeas corpus review, federal
courts applying AEDPA will never be asked, “Was this statement,
interpreted as clear below, actually ambiguous?” Therefore, those courts
will always be in a position to apply deference to the police, rather than
the defendant. This effect pushes invocation jurisprudence to the outer
limit of what constitutes a “reasonable” interpretation of Davis. Once
that limit is reached, the law will not stray far from it. As soon as one
court, whether applying AEDPA or not, interprets the law in a certain
way, it is more likely that a subsequent court will view that
interpretation as a reasonable one taken by “fairminded jurists.”189
Through the two-step process described above, a federal court creates
AEDPA pseudo-precedent deeming a phrase inadequate to invoke the
right to counsel, even if it might have interpreted it on de novo review as
a clear and unequivocal request. The net result is a more restrictive
standard for valid invocations than was perhaps originally intended.

188. See Strauss, supra note 15, at 1034 (noting that clear and unambiguous invocations of the
right to counsel might never make it into published opinions).
189. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (holding that a federal
habeas writ may only be granted if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree”). This
is despite the Court’s earlier warning that a decision is not reasonable merely because “at least one
of the Nation’s jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state court did.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2000).
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AEDPA Cases Set a High Clarity Burden that is Then Cited in
Non-AEDPA Decisions

The narrowing process begins when a federal habeas court applies to
a given phrase a standard of clarity that goes beyond what that court
might have decided on de novo review. One can most easily observe
AEDPA’s effect with reference to individual cases.190 The following two
cases illustrate this phenomenon by a quantitative measurement of their
effects.191
1.

Twenty-Eight Cases Have Cited the Phrase “I Think I Need a
Lawyer” to Reject Purported Invocations

On the night of January 13, 1993, Russel Burket brutally murdered
Katherine and Ashley Tafelski in their Virginia home.192 Seven days
later, when police questioned him as a suspect, Burket made two
statements about counsel, roughly twelve minutes apart.193 After the first
statement, “I’m gonna need a lawyer,” the police detectives advised
Burket that he was not under arrest and was free to go, after which the
interview resumed and Burket admitted to killing the victims.194 He then
said, “I think I need a lawyer,” at which point the detectives frisked him,
Mirandized him, and placed him in custody.195 The trial court denied
Burket’s motion to suppress his videotaped confession.196 Burket pled
guilty to the murders, as well as three other crimes associated with them,
“reserving the right to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his
confession.”197 The court sentenced Burket to death.198
190. It is difficult to say empirically whether AEDPA is responsible for narrowing the Miranda
right to counsel because of the varied nature of invocation phrases and the Court’s demonstrated
antipathy to Miranda in other areas. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250,
2260 (2010) (extending the Davis reasoning to the right to silence and requiring affirmative, verbal
invocation); see also Strauss, supra note 15, at 1033–34 (explaining the challenges of a
comprehensive analysis of Davis).
191. I chose these two examples not because they definitively show that a phrase that would pass
muster on de novo review fails on AEDPA review. That is almost impossible to demonstrate as
courts issuing published opinions are loath to undermine their own decisions by stating that they
disagree with the outcome. Rather, the examples used demonstrate how a phrase that might
reasonably be interpreted as a valid invocation under Davis could be affected by AEDPA.
192. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 177–80 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283.
193. Id. at 195.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 180.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Although Burket raised numerous issues in his subsequent federal
habeas petition, the only one relevant to this analysis was Burket’s
assertion that police violated his Miranda right to counsel.199 The Fourth
Circuit panel, reviewing the case under AEDPA, determined that it was
not unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme Court to conclude that
Burket’s first statement, “I’m gonna need a lawyer,” had not effectively
invoked Burket’s right to counsel because it was made prior to arrest.200
The Fourth Circuit then held that his second statement, “I think I need a
lawyer,” was inadequate as a request for counsel.201 The court dismissed
Burket’s appeal.202
To date, Burket has been cited in some 386 state and federal cases.203
Of those, thirty-two were non-AEDPA cases citing Burket on the rightto-counsel issue. In twenty-eight of those cases, Burket’s phrase, “I think
I need a lawyer,” was cited analogically to demonstrate that another
similar phrase was insufficient to invoke the right to counsel.204 None of
the twenty-eight cases discussed Burket’s AEDPA standard of review,205
and none expressly acknowledged that the Fourth Circuit might have
decided otherwise had it been reviewing the issue de novo.
Of the twenty-eight cases citing Burket to reject a suspect’s claimed
invocation of the right to counsel, eleven were state cases possibly
subject to future AEDPA review.206 Additionally, many state trial courts
199. See id. at 196.
200. Id. at 197.
201. Id. at 197–98.
202. Id. at 201.
203. Search of WESTLAW, KeyCite service (Nov. 10, 2011) (search for state and federal cases
citing Burket).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 281 F. App’x. 198, 199–200 (4th Cir. 2008) (“I think I
might need to talk to a lawyer.”); United States v. Williams, No. 5:08-CR-174-FL-1, 2009 WL
497143, at *1–2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2009) (“I don’t think I want to say anything more until I talk to
a lawyer.”), aff’d, No. 09-4812, 2011 WL 4361556 (4th Cir. Sept. 20, 2011); United States v.
Brown, Crim No. 06-148(01) (JMR/RLE), 2006 WL 2314057, at *14–15 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2006)
(“Can I call my lawyer?”); United States v. Sprouse, No. CRIM 5:01CR30051, 2002 WL 15866, at
*4 (W.D. Va. Jan. 8, 2002) (noting that suspect told police “that his counsel had advised him not to
speak with police”); People v. Donahee, No. 296050, 2011 WL 923501, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar.
17, 2011) (“I think this is where I need an attorney.”); People v. Kamyab, No. B187608, 2007 WL
1492257, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2007) (“I think it’s time I called my attorney.”). One court
cited Burket’s alleged right-to-silence invocations as justification for holding invalid a right-tocounsel invocation. United States v. Peters, 435 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2006).
205. But see United States v. DeGounette, No. 05-CR-45S, 2007 WL 607234, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2007) (noting Burket’s standard of review in a right-to-silence context); see also United
States v. Jourdain, Criminal No. 06-313 (01-02) (RHK/RLE), 2007 WL 269827, at *21–22 (D.
Minn. Jan. 26, 2007) (discussing Burket and Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir.
2001), and noting Dormire’s AEDPA standard of review, but not Burket’s).
206. Some of them did reach AEDPA review. For example, People v. Kamyab, 2007 WL
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have likely cited Burket in denials of motions to suppress based on the
Miranda right to counsel, and there are appellate opinions citing to
Burket in at least five states.207 These opinions have almost certainly
influenced trial court decisions.
2.

Twenty-Five Cases Have Cited the Phrase “I Think I Would Like to
Talk to a Lawyer” to Reject Purported Invocations

In a more recent case, habeas petitioner Billy Russell Clark
challenged his conviction in an Arizona court for the murder of his
stepmother, Anita Clark.208 After police arrested and Mirandized him,
two police detectives interviewed Clark after he waived his Miranda
rights.209 During the interview, a Detective Chambers informed Clark
that “there were serious problems with [his] story.”210 Clark replied by
saying, “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer.”211 Rather than halting
the interview, the detective told Clark that “if he wanted a lawyer
[Chambers] would call him one,” and left him alone “for a few minutes
to make a decision,” saying that when he returned “[he] would expect
[Clark’s] answer.”212 When Detective Chambers returned some thirty
minutes later, Clark indicated that he did not want a lawyer and would
continue talking.213 After another twenty minutes of questioning, Clark
1492257, led to a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied. Kamyab v. Uribe, No. CV
08-5557GAF (FMO), 2009 WL 1520022, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2009).
207. See People v. Kamyab, 2007 WL 1492257, at *7 (statement “I think it’s time I called my
attorney” invalid); Donahee, 2011 WL 923501, at *2 (statement “I think this is where I need an
attorney” invalid as invocation); People v. Powell, 304 A.D.2d 410, 410–11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(statement that he “thought he would wait for a lawyer” invalid); Com. v. Epps, No. 2271-09-1,
2010 WL 1439390, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010) (holding that question “Can I have my
lawyer present? . . . for now” invalid). In another case, In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2008), the
majority cited Burket in upholding the validity of the suspect’s statement that he “wanted his mother
to ask for an attorney,” id. at 325–26 (internal quotation marks omitted), while the dissent also cited
it to argue against the statement’s adequacy as an invocation, id. at 330 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
208. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968.
209. Id. at 1064–65.
210. Id. at 1065.
211. Id. The court noted that the record was inconsistent as to whether Clark said “I think I would
like to talk to a lawyer,” or “I think I’d like to talk to a lawyer.” Id. at 1065 n.2. Like the Arizona
court, the Ninth Circuit opted for the first phrase, but suggested that there was not any difference
between the two for the purposes of its analysis. Id. This is noteworthy because it demonstrates the
exacting precision with which courts examine everyday phraseology when they apply the Davis
“clear and unequivocal request” rule. That precision lies at the core of the AEDPA ratchet effect
because courts closely examining a possible invocation will look to other courts’ interpretations,
some of them made through AEDPA’s deferential prism.
212. Id. at 1065.
213. Id.
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asked the detective, “should I be telling you or should I talk to a
lawyer?”214 Detective Chambers responded by saying that, in his
opinion, a judge or jury would consider remorse as more important than
fear of punishment, and the interview continued.215 Soon after that, Clark
confessed to the murder.216 Before trial, he moved to suppress his
confession, but the trial court denied his motion, and a jury ultimately
convicted Clark of second degree murder and theft.217
Clark’s federal habeas petition, filed under AEDPA, rested primarily
on his assertion that the state trial court erred by admitting his
confession, which he contended was taken in violation of Edwards v.
Arizona.218 A magistrate judge determined that Clark had made an
unambiguous request for counsel and that the Arizona Court of Appeals
was unreasonable in holding otherwise.219 The district court, however,
rejected this conclusion and denied Clark’s habeas petition.220 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed.221 In reaching its conclusion, the court spent several
sentences discussing Burket v. Angelone,222 and comparing the statement
in that case (“I think I need a lawyer”223), with Clark’s (“I think I would
like to talk to a lawyer”).224 The court also discussed at length the
presence of the phrase, “I think,” in the statement.225 The Ninth Circuit
denied Clark’s appeal.226
It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in this case
some five months before amending and superseding it with a second
opinion.227 The amended opinion was published three months after the
U.S. Supreme Court’s excoriation of the Ninth Circuit’s AEDPA
approach in Lockyer v. Andrade.228 In its original opinion, the court

214. Id.
215. Id. at 1065–66.
216. Id. at 1066.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1069 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).
219. Id. at 1066.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1071.
222. 208 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2000).
223. Id. at 197.
224. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1071.
225. Id. at 1070–71.
226. Id. at 1072.
227. Id. at 1064; see also Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038, opinion amended and superseded on
denial of reh’g, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003).
228. 538 U.S. 63, 75–77 (2003).
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stated, “While the issue is a close one, we conclude that Clark’s
statement that he thought he would like to talk to a lawyer did not
constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel within
the meaning of Davis.”229 The court removed this language from the
amended opinion, stating instead that “the Arizona court’s determination
that Clark’s statement did not constitute an unambiguous and
unequivocal request for counsel within the meaning of Davis was not
contrary to clearly established [f]ederal law, nor was it an objectively
unreasonable application of such law.”230
The change in the superseding opinion is significant for two reasons.
First, the court originally expressed some reluctance to reject the
purported invocation before clarifying that what was “reasonable” was
the actual issue in the case. Second, it makes clear that the court
recognized the subtle, but important, difference between the two
holdings (helped along by Lockyer) and saw the need to state it directly
in its revised opinion. The fact that the court’s expression of reluctance
is absent from the post-Lockyer ruling shows how AEDPA obscures a
court’s underlying outlook on the constitutional issue at play. This
masking of the court’s underlying logic makes it difficult for subsequent
courts to determine the law as described in AEDPA’s pseudo-precedent.
Clark would be more useful as accurate guidance on invocation law if
AEDPA had not masked the court’s reluctance.
Clark has been cited in some 2298 state and federal cases.231 Of those,
113 cited Clark on the right-to-counsel issue, of which twenty-nine were
non-AEDPA cases. In all but four of those twenty-nine cases, Clark’s
statement, “I think I want to talk to a lawyer,” was cited as persuasive
precedent to hold on de novo review that a similar phrase was
insufficient to invoke the right to counsel.232 Of the twenty-five cases
229. Clark, 317 F.3d at 1046–47.
230. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1071.
231. Search of WESTLAW, KeyCite service (Nov. 10, 2011) (search for state and federal cases
citing Clark).
232. See, e.g., People v. Gaeta, No. F048162, 2006 WL 3233830, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9,
2006) (holding that phrase, “I need an attorney then cause . . . I don’t know what’s going on with
this,” equivocal under the circumstances); People v. Roquemore, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 224–25 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005) (question, “[C]an I call a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?” ambiguous); Davis v.
State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 339 n.53, 339–41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (phrase, “I should have an
attorney,” not a request for counsel). In one case, United States v. Fry, No. CR-09-44-N-JLQ, 2009
WL 1687958, at *4, *11–14 (D. Idaho June 16, 2009), the court determined that the defendant’s
question, “Do I get to have a lawyer to sit in?” was ambiguous, id. at 11, but police had failed to
clarify as required under United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring
police to clarify ambiguous pre-waiver requests). Fry, 2009 WL 1687958, at *12–14. In another,
People v. Sims, No. 285475, 2009 WL 1693722 (Mich. Ct. App. June 16, 2009), the court applied
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citing Clark to hold an invocation invalid, eleven were state cases,
themselves subject to possible federal AEDPA review. In the four cases
in which Clark’s phrase was not used to hold invalid a right-to-counsel
invocation, it was cited twice in dissent,233 once as contrary precedent in
a holding of validity,234 and once against an invocation of the right to
silence.235 Only one decision noted that Clark was decided under the
AEDPA standard of review.236
Both Burket and Clark demonstrate the risk that the AEDPA standard
of review poses to the integrity of substantive law.237 State and federal
trial courts are prone to treat precedent like Burket and Clark as
determinative of what constitutes a valid request for counsel, rather than
what is not an “objectively unreasonable” interpretation of Davis. When
federal courts appear to reject phrases as clear to the layperson as “I
think I would like to talk to a lawyer” or “I think I want a lawyer,” they
become powerfully persuasive to judges analyzing similar statements or
questions in courts of the first instance.238
Clark in considering the phrase, “I think I should have an attorney here, you know,” but used a
“clear error” rather than de novo standard of review. Id. at *2.
233. People v. Nelson, No. G040151, 2010 WL 673215, at *25–26 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2010)
(Aronson, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority’s holding that suspect’s requests to speak to his mother
constituted an invocation of his Miranda rights); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 331 n.2 (Tex. 2008)
(Jefferson, J., dissenting) (with reference to Clark’s habeas posture, rejecting majority’s holding that
suspect’s statement that he “wanted his mother to ask an attorney” was valid as invocation).
234. People v. Jones, No. 273193, 2007 WL 292532, at *2–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2007)
(holding “[C]an I have one now while we talk?” is a valid invocation).
235. State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 134 (Idaho 2008).
236. Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16, 27 n.31 (Nev. 2004).
237. Burket and Clark are not alone in the realm of the Miranda right to counsel. See, e.g.,
Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2001) (phrase, “Could I call my lawyer?” cited
in twenty-eight non-AEDPA federal cases and eight state cases, mostly to deny motions to suppress
founded on Miranda right to counsel).
238. In addition to narrowing the invocation standard, AEDPA may have also expanded the
situations in which Davis applies. As many scholars have noted, the Davis “clear and unequivocal
request” rule originally applied only to phrases uttered after the suspect had waived his Miranda
rights. See Harvey Gee, Essay: When Do You Have to Be Clear?: Reconsidering Davis v. United
States, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 381, 399–414 (2001); supra note 106. However, many courts have
erroneously applied Davis to statements made before a suspect has waived his right to counsel. See
2 LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 8, at 866 n.185 (listing numerous cases applying Davis pre-waiver).
AEDPA has exacerbated this broadening of the Davis rule into pre-waiver invocations in the
same way as it narrowed suspects’ invocation options. When courts have applied Davis pre-waiver,
they have made its application pre-waiver not “objectively unreasonable.” This made it easier for
courts to apply the “clear and unequivocal request” rule pre-waiver on AEDPA review. See
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (holding that a federal habeas writ
may only be granted if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree”). Additionally,
because the U.S. Supreme Court left open the question of what rule applies to statements made
before a suspect has waived his Miranda rights, it cannot be “clearly established [f]ederal law.” 28
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THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD DISCOURAGE
COURTS NOT APPLYING AEDPA FROM RELYING ON
AEDPA CASES

AEDPA presents a substantial risk of weakening substantive
constitutional protections, both in the case of the Miranda right to
counsel and in other areas of criminal law. Typically, this shift will
narrow defendants’ rights because AEDPA is only applied in cases in
which defendants are convicted, and it requires a high degree of
deference to those convictions.239
As described above,240 this ratchet effect will perpetuate itself as state
courts cite federal AEDPA decisions to reject defendants’ constitutional
challenges, and those defendants then challenge their convictions in
federal habeas petitions governed by AEDPA. The net result will be that
the rights that the Court articulated will be whittled away to their bare
minimum. In the case of invoking the Miranda right to counsel, this
ratchet effect could pare down the phrases acceptable to satisfy the
Davis clear and unequivocal request rule to only the most crystal clear.
As Justice Souter put it, courts and police will expect “suspects to speak
with the discrimination of an Oxford don.”241
For these reasons, courts rendering a decision on anything other than
the AEDPA standard of review should refrain from relying on cases

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that where the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly left a question open, it cannot be “clearly
established” and courts applying AEDPA must affirm).
This problem is particularly pointed in the Ninth Circuit, which requires police to clarify
ambiguous pre-waiver invocations, but not those made after a waiver. United States v. Rodriguez,
518 F.3d 1072, 1074, 1078–79 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). So, where a court in the Ninth Circuit is
reviewing a case de novo, it will apply Rodriguez and may grant a motion to suppress, e.g., United
States v. Nejbauer, No. CR09-0670-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 3710713, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2,
2009); but on AEDPA review, it will disregard Rodriguez and the motion’s denial will stand, e.g.,
Sessoms v. Runnels, 650 F.3d 1276, 1283–84, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2011). This phenomenon amounts
to an internal circuit split.
The Court recently mooted this issue in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250,
2260 (2010), by implicitly extending the Davis “clear and unequivocal request” rule to pre-waiver
situations. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor vigorously disputed the Court’s ruling, saying that the
Davis holding is “explicitly predicated” on the existence of the suspect’s prior valid waiver. Id. at
2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
239. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
409–12 (2000)) (“The unreasonable application clause requires the state court decision to be more
than incorrect or erroneous. . . . [it] must be objectively unreasonable.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
240. See supra Part IV.
241. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 476 (Souter, J., concurring).
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decided under AEDPA. Both state and federal courts should exercise
this restraint, although federal courts are at a somewhat lower risk of
ratcheting down defendants’ rights because their decisions will not be
subject to subsequent review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This precaution
would arrest the AEDPA ratchet effect and confine the scope of the
legislation to what Congress originally intended.242 In other words, the
restrictive shift AEDPA created will halt where it stands. In order to put
this halt into effect, the U.S. Supreme Court should discourage courts
from basing their decisions on AEDPA cases unless the citing court is
also applying AEDPA.243
While it is true that this precaution would limit the range of citable
opinions, there would be ample precedent available to trial courts and
direct-review appeals courts. First, any non-AEDPA decision (both state
and federal) would be available. Additionally, there are at least six years
of habeas decisions applying Davis untainted by AEDPA. Davis was
decided in 1994, two years before AEDPA’s enactment, and AEDPA’s
standard of review did not control most of the habeas cases decided by
federal appeals courts from 1996 to 2000.244 Almost all of these cases
decided Davis issues on a de novo standard of review, and courts
continue to apply that standard in non-AEDPA cases.245
Even if they persist in citing AEDPA cases, courts not applying
AEDPA should acknowledge the statute’s highly deferential standard of
review. They should also account for the standard’s effect on the
substantive constitutional analysis in the case they are citing. This
approach may be wise. Federal decisions rendered under AEDPA could
conceivably have legitimate precedential or persuasive value to trial or
direct review courts. For example, a trial court might face an unclear
area of federal law and cite an AEDPA case to say what the law is,
regardless of how it should be applied or what interpretations of it are

242. See supra text accompanying notes 141–153.
243. The Court is not the only entity that can act in this space. Some have argued that Congress
should eliminate all federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions except for rare “cases
where the remedial benefits of the Great Writ will be worth the costs.” Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy
J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 818–23
(2009). This solution, while extreme and not endorsed here, would also tend to eliminate AEDPA’s
ratchet effect by halting the practice of federal courts decreeing what is and is not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
244. See Blume, supra note 20, at 284.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that
“Maybe I should get an attorney” or “Do I need an attorney?” are not valid invocations on de novo
review), cert. denied sub nom., Armijo v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 177.
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reasonable.246 In other words, a court may need an AEDPA case with
similar facts to “correctly identif[y] the governing legal rule,”247 even if
it does not look to that case as guidance for application of the rule. Even
if it uses the interpretation deemed reasonable by the AEDPA decision,
the non-AEDPA court in this scenario should be careful to note the
confining and deferential nature of the AEDPA standard of review.
In addition, federal courts deciding habeas petitions under
§ 2254(d)(1) should clearly state the standard of review applied in their
holdings. If a federal court of appeals, deciding a case under AEDPA,
states clearly in its holding that it is only determining that the decision
on review was not “objectively unreasonable,”248 a non-AEDPA court
would likely find the holding less persuasive than if that caveat were
absent.249 By inserting such a warning, federal courts applying AEDPA
would help mitigate AEDPA’s effect on substantive constitutional law.
However, the approach of adding an explicit reference to the standard of
review is merely a precautionary supplement to, and cannot replace, the
U.S. Supreme Court admonition proposed above.
CONCLUSION
AEDPA’s ratchet effect has narrowed the substantive constitutional
protections afforded by the Miranda right to counsel by making the
Davis “clear and unequivocal request” rule harder to satisfy. However,
this effect is not restricted to the Miranda right to counsel. Any number
of other substantive areas of criminal law could be affected in the same
way. Because a federal court reviewing a state court ruling under
AEDPA must ask only if the state ruling is an “objectively
unreasonable” application of federal law, any potentially “reasonable”
interpretation of substantive law will stand, even if it is “incorrect or
erroneous.”250 That federal decision upholding as reasonable the state
246. Indeed, § 2254 requires a federal court to first determine what is the federal law “as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
247. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000).
248. See, e.g., Sessoms v. Runnels, 650 F.3d 1276, 1288, 1289 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating its
AEDPA holdings clearly).
249. But compare Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (expressly holding that
the Virginia Supreme Court’s rejection of defendant’s Miranda right-to-counsel claim “was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States”), and Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003)
(same with regard to Arizona court ruling), with People v. Kamyab, No. B187608, 2007 WL
1492257, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2007) (citing both Burket and Clark, but ignoring the AEDPA
dimension of the holdings).
250. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409–12).
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court’s interpretation can then be cited by any lower court, even though
it does not represent the federal court’s own interpretation of federal law,
as would be the case in the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of review. In
the case of the Miranda right to counsel, this means that as more and
more AEDPA precedent is created, state-court interpretations of federal
rights will supplant those of lower federal courts, resulting in the strictest
invocation standard Davis will allow. That is, thanks in part to AEDPA,
suspects wishing to invoke their right to counsel may ultimately be
required to say nothing less clear than, “I want a lawyer.”

